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How may the stature and security of the United States, so passionately a concern for many and 
so profoundly important to the character and direction of our emerging global society, be 
pursued responsibly? This question is the burden of this article, in which the author examines 
and rejects a number of policy options to the challenges he sees Washington now facing. He 
rejects these policy options because he finds them miscast, incomplete, counterproductive, or 
representative of symptoms rather than causes. He suggests, instead, how the United States 
might advance its interests and the global interests and predicts a rather unwelcoming future for 
the United States—and the world—if Washington were to continue following the current 
extension of nineteenth- and twentieth-century “national security” practices.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
  
All, all of a piece throughout 
Thy chase had a beast in view; 
Thy wars brought nothing about; 
Thy lovers were all untrue. 
’Tis well an old age is out, 
And time to begin a new. 
 
—John Dryden, “The Secular Masque”  
 
We in the United States are again in the middle of an election cycle that will result in the 
selection of our next president, the principal architect of our foreign policy. As the leader of the 
most powerful country in the highly decentralized but rapidly rising, single global society, the 
next president will, for good or ill, have a most profound impact on the nature and direction of 
that society for decades to come as he or she pursues the stature and security of the United States 
in the world. 
 
Issues, Problems, or Challenges 
Advocates for the policy positions the United States should take are plentiful. One whose 
position fairly captures the dominant stances likely to be found in any literature review is 
Richard N. Haas, president of the Council on Foreign Relations. Haas spells out his position in 
the November–December 2014 issue of the journal Foreign Affairs.1 
Haas sees a disordered world expressed, first, through decades of conflict in the Middle East 
that resemble the Thirty Years’ War in seventeenth-century Europe (1618–1648). In his view, 
the communal and sectarian identities involved in this drawn-out fighting are the principal cause  
of the conflict. Second, he sees the “instability on the periphery of Europe” (the Ukraine) as  
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having been caused by Russia’s decision to give up “on the proposition of significant integration 
into the current European and global orders,” electing instead to take an alternative course of 
action, including fomenting the crisis in Kiev. The third expression of the disorder is in Asia, 
where the potential for instability is centered on “robust identities, dynamic economies, rising 
military budgets, bitter historical memories, and unresolved territorial disputes.”2 
Haas adds the Korean conflict and a turbulent Pakistan to the concern about Asia. On a 
global level, he sees “cross-border flows of terrorists,” viruses, greenhouse gas emissions (with 
inadequate institutional mechanism to deal with either of them), the rise of populism, and 
increasing inequality. Of the concerns, issues, and challenges expressive of disorder, none is of 
more weight to Haas than the declining superpower status of the United States and the absence of 
a likely successor “waiting to pick up the baton.” 
 
Likely Solutions or Recommended Policy Thrusts 
Haas suggests that the United States forgo the policy of regime change in the Middle East (to 
create societies more like us) and accept the notion that getting people to accept liberal 
democracy is more difficult than is generally supposed. Complementing this approach should be 
efforts to promote civil society, help refugees, and counter “terrorism and militancy,” sometimes 
with the application of force. With regard to Asia, he thinks priority ought to be given to the 
“pivot” or “rebalancing” strategy President Barack Obama is pursuing in East Asia (to contain 
China), including his efforts to gain domestic support for the proposed trans-Pacific trade 
agreement. This policy, the president hopes, will induce China to “reconsider” its behavior in 
several areas, such as its stance on certain disputed claims to islands in the South China Sea. 
With regard to Russia and the Ukrainian conflict, Haas proposes a mixture of efforts designed to 
“shore up” Ukraine economically and militarily, strengthen NATO, and impose sanctions on 
Russia (to which some “diplomatic exit” should be allowed, including assurances that the 
Ukraine will not be part of NATO any time soon), and lessen European dependency on 
Moscow’s energy resources. At the global level, the United States should follow a policy of 
“integration,” that is, try to bring other states into “arrangements to manage global challenges 
such as climate change, terrorism, proliferation, trade, public health, and maintaining a secure 
and open commons.”3 
Associated with these policy thrusts is Haas’s urging that the United States put its “domestic 
house in order” so it can “increase Americans’ living standards” and “generate the resources 
needed to sustain an active global role.” “A stagnant and unequal society,” he concludes, “will be 
unlikely to trust its government or favor robust efforts abroad.”4 
 
Examination of Challenges and Prescriptions 
Haas’s list of challenges is incomplete and miscast, and, in some instances, it represents 
symptoms rather than causes; and the suggested prescriptions are either inadequate or 
counterproductive.  
At the incomplete level are the wholesale demographic changes that are taking place in the 
world, whether one looks at age levels (in Western Europe and Japan, for example, which are not 
even replacing their populations), the groups actively involved—including subversively—in 
politics, or those looking to public life, through the Internet or otherwise, for alternatives in 
which they can believe. Missing also is religion as an identity marker, as an inspiring mobilizer, 
and as a fighting rhetorical tool, among the weak, rather than simply a “communal” presence. 
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Missing, too, is the technology that permits networking within and across borders, and 
transnational links that are fast replacing international ones. To identify what is “taking place” in 
the Middle East as a contemporary expression of the Thirty Years’ War in Europe is to poorly 
understand the broader “movement for renewal” among Arabs (and within Islam) that began in 
the nineteenth century (some might say earlier) and to overlook European attitudes toward 
Jews—an attitude that also urged renewal (in the form of Zionism)—that predate the nineteenth 
century. One may note that all of Asia, including South, West, Central, and Southeast Asia, 
China, and Russia, are undergoing the struggle for renewal, as are Africa, Latin America, and the 
Caribbean, though less dramatically in some sites. This struggle must be understood as a long-
term phenomenon, with different groups seeking to forge the content and direction of that 
renewal. 
Nothing is said about the deep anger (not just mistrust—many groups historically have 
developed mistrust of government) that is widely shared among large numbers of people, 
including many in the United States, toward political leaders and political parties and their 
rhetoric and insincerity. And seeking to place Russia, the Arab countries, Islam in general, and 
China under “European and world orders” whose rules and processes have been shaped largely 
or created by the West and largely perceived by others as operating in the pursuit of the West’s 
interests is unlikely to work effectively—especially when many societies are seeking or 
undergoing renewal. People have different insights, histories, memories, experiences, 
orientations, belief systems, conceptual arrangements or structures, and justifications and 
explanations for the world they encounter and their condition of being. These cannot be 
dismissed or overlooked in seeking to shape policy. 
The issue of “terrorism” and its transborder movement must be addressed, but one must look 
at this phenomenon through the eyes of those who feel marginalized and think that, to overcome 
confinement or to be on the margins, unrestrained physical coercion and violence is required and 
that the “authority” to use such force should be partially found in the moral, spiritual, and social 
weaknesses of those institutions against which the terror may be applied. In some instances (and 
here I would cite as an example the Thirty Years’ War), terrorism is used by the nation-state, 
whose very birth gave rise to its earned monopoly to use force to advance its interest. Nuclear 
weapons are terror weapons, which the state claims a right to use; it is not by accident that the 
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) seeks and claims the status of a state. Force alone or the 
use of mostly force is not the answer here, since one “terrorist group” will be replaced by 
another, perhaps with successors even more fearsome. 
The prescriptions for each of the other issues Haas identifies fare no better. Giving economic 
aid to the Ukraine (a victim of balance-of-power politics), increasing sanctions on Russia, and 
strengthening NATO; supporting the trans-Pacific “pivot”; increasing military spending, in the 
aggregate and in specific areas of concerns previously mentioned—all are flawed. How does 
increasing sanctions against Russia help the United States in its need of Russia to help solve the 
crisis in Syria, settle matters with Iran, and improve conditions in the Ukraine, the economy of 
which has important links to Russia and the areas of the Ukraine under the control of groups 
loyal to Russia? How does strengthening NATO and further embarrassing Russia (and we might 
not have acted differently had we lost the Cold War and Russia were extending Warsaw Pact 
troops near Mexico) provide confidence-building in the tackling of problems throughout the 
world? We will touch on one other—military spending. 
The United States is the largest seller of weapons to other countries—some of these sales 
end up with nonstate groups. There are estimates that the wars in Iraq and Iran could cost the 
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United States over $4 trillion; and we currently have a military budget that is the highest in our 
history—over $637 billion (not including military-related expenditures, such as veterans affairs; 
pensions to military retirees; intelligence-gathering spending by NASA; nuclear weapons 
research, maintenance, cleanup, and production; and interest on the debt incurred in past wars). 
What is even more telling, over 53 percent of all discretionary spending (for which funds are not 
already committed) goes to military spending. And yet, the problems of the world have not 
become more manageable, because using force as the solution to human problems has never 
really worked.5  
And where will all the funds come from to support education, build infrastructure, generate 
employment at income levels that produce the taxes needed for the military and economic 
activities incident to all the political confrontations that are being urged? What happens to the 
moral and social climate in the United States and the world?  
Despite recognizing a number of global problems, Haas says nothing about the world 
financial system and the dysfunction and corruption associated with it, nothing about the process 
by which wealth and income are progressively being transferred to fewer and fewer persons or 
groups of people. We merely see reference to the poor and poverty. The lack of civic 
responsibility on the part of most transnational corporations, an economic system that seeks 
profits at the expense of everything else, including the environment and society, the dominant 
political ideology (nationalism) that will sacrifice everything to national security, including its 
own citizens, and even the destruction of the world—the implications of nuclear weapons are 
unmentioned. There is no mention of the United Nations. 
It is understandable that the United Nations and other like institutions should go 
unmentioned: they are assumed, unchanged, to be a likely part of any future order. This means 
we are approaching the future with the tools of the past, and yet we seem to expect different 
results. There is no historical evidence that this form of thinking ever succeeds. 
 
What Is to Be Done? 
The substance of the proposals Haas presents (and his descriptive identities of the issues and 
challenges) suggests a commitment to the old balance-of-power real politics, with its focus on 
exclusion, vulnerability to foes—actual and potential—coercive punishment or threat of that 
punishment, and blindness to the dynamics of power, including the culture of violence it 
cultivates. Underlying much of this thinking is the United States’ global leadership. 
The United States should aim for the very opposite: inclusion, mutual security, cultural 
empathy, and nonviolent resolution of conflict, de-emphasizing nationalism and the old notions 
of balance of power. Let us touch on each of these. 
The focus of balance-of-power politics on exclusion springs from its concern with security, 
which is grounded in the nation-state, the only sovereign institution we have. The state is 
supreme, and thus, all international or transnational authority is decentralized and subject to the 
claims of the state. Since each state is legally and morally equal and has equal claims to the need 
for security, which is seen as resulting from national power, a zero-sum game mentality 
develops—the power one gains is what another loses. If China becomes more powerful, the 
United States is becoming less so. If NATO gains greater influence in the Ukraine, Russia is 
losing influence and power there; hence, Russia’s reaction to the actual or perceived conduct of 
the West, led by the United States, toward the Ukraine. Balance-of-power politics is also an 
explanation for the United States’ response to different alignments of states and political 
groupings in the Middle East and our forming of a ring of alliances around China, the Pacific 
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“pivot,” including a trans-Pacific trade bloc that does exclude China. Exclusion extends to who is 
a citizen, whose loyalty is sought and recognized, who is an ally, who has access to intellectual 
property, who gets to be a special trade partner, what types of weapons can be had, whose 
identity is or becomes part of a sentimental ideal, and who may be members of a “galaxy of 
groups.” 
The dynamics of power makes things worse. As China observes the United States becoming 
more powerful (militarily, for example), it feels it too must increase military spending, which 
will make Japan and Russia nervous, as Israel is nervous about Iran’s gaining nuclear weapons, 
though Israel has those weapons. And what of Saudi Arabia and Egypt with respect to Iran’s 
claim to nuclear capabilities? They want to have like capabilities, unless the United States sells 
them more “superior weapons.” Having superior coercive capability (something that terrorized 
the world during the nuclear arms race between the West and the Soviet bloc) is an effort to 
make the “enemy”—meaning peoples and societies—vulnerable, while making oneself relatively 
invulnerable. Where one state or group of states has the resources to match that of another in 
developing coercive capabilities, a condition of “mutual vulnerability or mutual assured 
destruction” results, as was experienced during the Cold War. 
By amassing superior power a state will seek to reserve to itself (hence a reluctance to use 
international bodies like the United Nations) the right to punish those who act contrary to its 
interest or to threaten them with punishment. Such a state, or group of states, that enjoys this type 
of power frequently uses itself and its social and political culture as its principal or even sole 
frame of reference, because it tends to feel superior, by virtue of its superior power. So, for a 
long time, we have had “exceptionalism”: Athenian, Persian, Roman, British, French, German, 
American, Russian, and Western. As with all dominant countries and cultures throughout history, 
the sense of exceptionalism is accompanied by a lack of empathy for the other. It is hard for the 
West, for example, to understand the struggle or search for renewal among much of the non-
West, even though the West has gone through many an effort at renewal in its own history. We 
have already noted the limited efficacy of the use of force, and Afghanistan reinforces this 
lesson. So, in keeping with the suggestions at the beginning of this section, the United States—
under its next president—should aim, using its own history of renewal after the Civil War and 
during the John F. Kennedy–Martin Luther King and the modern women’s movements, to 
reorient its foreign policy. 
That reorientation should begin with the principle of inclusion, offering as a priority, 
security for all—not only those under NATO or the Rio Treaty but all human beings—by 
helping to set up a mechanism that will bring to bear the collective presence of all nations in the 
security of each. The United States is in a position to lead in this endeavor if for no other reason 
than that it has a military force that outdistances, by far, those of other states and expenditures 
for which are greater than the combined amounts of all major powers, but also because 
Washington and its allies account for more than two-thirds of all military spending. Inclusion 
might be accomplished by either a full implementation of Article 47 of the U.N. Charter (which 
deals with the Military Staff Committee), along with a reform of the Security Council, or a 
broader reform under Article 109 of the charter. From such a course of action, one could more 
effectively employ nonviolent modes of conflict resolution, accompanied by appropriate levels 
of disarmament at the national level, focus on dealing with the division of Korea, whose 
people—North and South—have long suffered, and, likewise, address the issues of the Middle 
East and South Sudan, among others. 
New England Journal of Public Policy 
6 
 
Inclusion also would entail reshaping the Economic and Social Council of the United 
Nations and working with a reformed International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to 
encourage greater transparency and to address the structural issues involved in world economic 
transactions that involve the social cooperation of many, many people but that unfortunately 
occasion an income and wealth distribution to fewer and fewer. The simultaneous progressive 
implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights with 
incentives to support a corporate culture that does not focus exclusively on returns to 
shareholders but considers returns to employees, consumers, and communities as well should be 
pursued; and the long-debated Tobin tax of a cent on each international economic transaction to 
finance the United Nations should be endorsed and pushed.  
Coupled with the preceding economic and military changes should be a focus on the 
urbanization of the world, the relationship of urban areas to rural areas, the existing and future 
built and natural environment, the degradation of natural systems, the life of the planet itself, and 
the moral and stewardship responsibilities each person and group owes to all biotic communities. 
We need as well a new emphasis on human development (not European, American, African, or 
Southeast Asian) within the context of the elementary moral and legal principles imbedded in the 
International Bill of Human Rights. That bill recognizes that everyone is entitled “to a social and 
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this [Universal] Declaration [of 
Human Rights] is fully realized.”6 This important policy orientation could help bring into being a 
special counterhegemonic, inclusive order (unlike earlier others) that focuses on all humans. 
Linked to this focus would be a new emphasis on education, including a new press that 
would, under Article 19 of the International Bill of Human Rights, help each person to 
understand and enjoy the right “to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers.” That education would also be defined by collaboration with 
the rest of the world to look at world history without an “inner gaze toward” the deployment of 
that history to further the claimed uniqueness of those groups that seek to subjugate the least 
socially favored and support domination. Out of such a study (with all the accompanying 
curricular reforms) the human capacity for empathy will further unfold, especially if one were to 
link the effort in education to discoveries about each other’s ways and condition of being, and to 
the education and training of children and youth. For such education and training, the United 
States would work with the United Nations and its members to implement the 1965 U.N. 
Declaration on the Promotion among Youth of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect, and 
Understanding between Peoples with travel, exchanges, tourism, meetings, the study of foreign 
languages, the twinning of towns and universities, and a problem-solving approaches to learning. 
They (the young people) should be part of a world youth movement, dedicated to help build the 
future that they will be called on to lead, through 
 a deepened understanding of the challenges facing humankind, opportunities to explore 
their causes and instill the shared hope and confidence that such challenges, being of 
human origin, are amenable to human solutions; 
 identifying the early signs of impending global problems in local phenomena, developing 
sensitivity to such signs, and empowering people to take concerted action; and 
 fostering empathetic imagination and a keen awareness that actions that benefit one’s 
own country might have a negative impact on or might be perceived as a threat by other 
countries, elevating this to a shared pledge not to seek one’s happiness and prosperity at 
the expense of others.7 
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Finally, the United States should argue for a certain physiosocial and legal infrastructure. In 
the first, the largest portion of the savings realized from the new military circumstances of the 
world—the collective defense for each and all states will result in immense savings for each 
country—should be used to repair, build, improve, redirect, or elaborate the physical 
infrastructure of countries. That course of action would benefit everyone, especially if it is 
undertaken in a manner that is consistent with sustainability. Soldiers or former soldiers might be 
able to help in this repairing, building, improving, redirecting, and elaborating; so, too, would the 
youth of the world. 
The network of social support to children and the elderly, as well as to the disabled and 
otherwise needy, should never be withdrawn and should be augmented where possible. The 
social infrastructures that make this support actual should be strengthened. 
Of equal importance must be our attention to the emerging legal infrastructure that deals 
with human rights, the world’s oceans, and the criminal conduct of states and their leaders. The 
area of criminal conduct is governed by the recently created International Criminal Court. This 
court, properly developed and administered, can be a most important institution in getting states 
and their leaders, in general (not only those from Africa), to act in a manner that comports with 
international law, including laws dealing with torture, genocide, aggression, and human 
trafficking. Tertiary education, including that done by law schools, should focus on human rights 
and human rights law, so that professors, students, judges, prosecutors, police, caregivers, and 
citizens at large are fully apprised of their importance and our mutual moral and legal 
responsibilities. And, with regard to the world’s oceans, the International Seabed Authority 
should be supported, to ensure a more orderly way of dealing with over two-thirds of the earth’s 
surface by shaping practices that can help us better respond to the concerns of the world’s 
commons. 
Together, the proposals mentioned in this section could begin to help the world deal with the 
fear, anger, mistrust, bitterness, and progressive marginalization of even the most sacred of 
values—the wholesale spying on people, including citizens by countries that consider themselves 
democratic, the killing of citizens living abroad, without the due process of law, and the 
beheading of individuals to create fear and shock. Perhaps they may even inspire individual and 
collective hope. 
Given the tone and content of recent debates by presidential candidates, these proposals 
might be seen as coming from someone who is tone-deaf. We are, however, at a crossroads in 
international relations that gives us another chance for renewal, including an opportunity to 
resolve a dilemma that Albert Camus comments on eloquently in his work The Rebel. He notes 
that those in favor of war—even the most enlightened—claim that if direct, organized violence is 
necessary, it is inexcusable. They not have sought to resolve the dilemma, however, by seeking 
to build conditions that will make violence unnecessary. They have preferred instead to ignore 
the inexcusable component of the dilemma or have continued to console themselves in the name 
of history (national security, for example, civilization, the purportedly degraded enemies) to add 
murder to murder until what remains is nothing but a continuous violation of everything in 
human beings that protests against injustice and the undermining of human dignity. We have an 
opportunity, with the lead of the United States, to help deal with this dilemma and many of its 
associated circumstances. 
The alternative is to have the United States extend itself, as implicitly urged by Haas, into 
what Arnold Toynbee called “a universal state,” one that will, egged on by patriots (“lovers”), 
become exhausted from “obligations in every corner of the globe,” destroying its immense 
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promise and coming to resemble the site of T. S. Eliot’s Waste Land, which was fruitful and now 
is not, where life was rich, varied, beautiful, organized, and even lofty, despite weaknesses and 
has now morphed into something dragging itself out in a poverty-stricken, drug-dependent, and 
disrupted and ugly tedium, without health, and no consolation of morality.8 
This country does not merit such a fate and, to the extent that its stature and security are 
imbedded in the common security of humankind, it will be affirming its loftiest values and 
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